Extensive data about mortgage lending activity collected pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) was just made available to the public for the first time on March 29, 2019. More detail about borrowers, about underwriting, and about loan features is now available than ever before, and that information also is easier for the public to access than it ever has been. The mortgage lending industry should expect that the expanded HMDA data will receive significant attention and scrutiny from private organizations and individuals, and the data is certain to spark controversy about the racial, ethnic and gender fairness of mortgage lending.Read More
In December of 2018, the Senate confirmed Kathy Kraninger as the second Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). The path Director Kraninger will chart is uncertain, but the CFPB has already begun initiating changes to which the financial services industry should pay attention. For instance, in mid-December 2018, the CFPB issued a proposed rule to modify its No-Action Letter Program (the “Program”) and to establish a regulatory “sandbox” (a formal process to temporarily exempt companies from certain statues and regulations so they can test new products with consumers). Below, we provide a brief history of the Program as well as a discussion of the key elements of the proposed rule.
The U.S. Supreme Court has issued numerous decisions over the past decade addressing arbitration agreements.  In one of the Roberts Court’s first forays into the arbitration arena, the Court held that class or collective arbitration is only available where the parties have affirmatively agreed to resolve their disputes through such procedures.  But who determines whether the parties have so agreed — a court or an arbitrator?
The U.S. Supreme Court to Address Whether Counterclaim Defendants Can Remove Class Action Claims Under CAFA
On September 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for writ for certiorari in Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, No. 17-1471 (“Home Depot”), to address two issues: (1) whether, under the federal Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), a third-party defendant can remove to federal court class action claims that are brought as counterclaims by the defendant/third-party plaintiff; and (2) whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets  — that an original plaintiff may not remove a counterclaim against it — extends to third-party counterclaim defendants.  Resolution of these issues by the Supreme Court may have significant implications for any counterclaim or third-party defendant (and possibly any counterclaim defendant) seeking to remove a class action or a mass action from state to federal court.
On June 28, 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”). CCPA grants new privacy rights to Californian residents and applies a notice and consent framework to most businesses operating in California that collect personal information from those residents.
Recent activity in Congress suggests that the return from the July 4th recess will see a continued push to reform the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) before year’s end. This alert provides an overview of the current state of play and the most likely outcome.
Should a Massachusetts homeowner be allowed to claim a homestead exemption in a principal residence that is also used for business or other commercial purposes? Answering this question several years ago as a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts adopted a fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiry into the “predominant use” of the property. The predominant use test was developed to address the point at which an owner forfeits homestead protection in the pursuit of commercial activity. The inquiry recognizes the ubiquity of the home office or boarder in modern residences. Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth Katz’s recent opinion in In re Shove takes a fresh look at the Massachusetts Homestead Statute and rejects the predominant use inquiry as unnecessary and, in some cases, unduly burdensome on the homesteader.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff cannot file a class action outside the applicable statute of limitations merely because an unsuccessful prior class action tolled the limitations period for individual claims. In China Agritech v. Resh, the Court held that its prior jurisprudence “does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class action past expiration of the statute of limitations.” Rather, that jurisprudence only tolls the statute of limitations for unnamed class members to intervene in the action “individually or file individual claims if the class fails.” In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that “[t]he Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] provide a range of mechanisms to aid courts in” overseeing complex litigation, such as where individual claims are added on after a denial of class certification. But, critically, “[w]hat the Rules do not offer is a reason to permit plaintiffs to exhume failed class actions by filing new, untimely class claims.”
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,  the U.S. Supreme Court held that “a party may not be compelled” under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”  The Stolt-Nielsen Court found that an agreement that is silent on the availability of class arbitration does not provide sufficient evidence that the parties intended to submit to class, as opposed to individual, arbitration.  The Court, however, left open the question of what level of specificity an agreement must contain to demonstrate the parties’ consent to submit a dispute to class arbitration. 
In Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., the Seventh Circuit allowed a data breach class action to survive the pleadings stage, including a challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing. At the same time, the Court indicated that the plaintiffs may have a tough time proving their claims on the merits or establishing that class certification is warranted. That warning may put the brakes on this action as well as others brought on a similar theory of liability.