Tag: Ninth Circuit

1
No Rubber Stamp: Ninth Circuit Reverses Certification of Nationwide Class Settlement Due to Failure to Account for Variations in State Law
2
Ninth Circuit Clarifies Amount in Controversy Standard Where Borrower Seeks Only “Temporary” Foreclosure Stay Pending Loan Modification Review
3
Spokeo Redux: Ninth Circuit Holds That a Statutory Violation under FCRA May, without More, Establish a Concrete Injury for Purposes of Article III Standing
4
Federal Court of Appeals Holds That Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Are Not Agents of the United States, But Open Questions Remain

No Rubber Stamp: Ninth Circuit Reverses Certification of Nationwide Class Settlement Due to Failure to Account for Variations in State Law

By David D. Christensen and Matthew N. Lowe

The Ninth Circuit recently clarified in In re Hyundai and Kia Fuel Economy Litigation that district courts must carefully scrutinize class settlements to ensure that they satisfy each of the prerequisites of Rule 23, especially for Rule 23(b)(3) classes, and that courts cannot substitute the fairness of a settlement for the proper certification analysis. Of particular note, the court emphasized the need to analyze whether potential material differences in the applicable states’ laws preclude certification of a nationwide settlement class.

To read the full alert, click here.

Ninth Circuit Clarifies Amount in Controversy Standard Where Borrower Seeks Only “Temporary” Foreclosure Stay Pending Loan Modification Review

By David D. Christensen and Matthew N. Lowe

The Ninth Circuit recently limited the availability of diversity jurisdiction for certain cases with claims involving mortgage loan modifications. Specifically, in Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that, where the plaintiff-borrower “seeks only a temporary stay of foreclosure pending review of a loan modification application … the value of the property or amount of indebtedness are not the amounts in controversy.” — F.3d —-, 2017 WL 6601872, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2017). Rather, to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement in such cases, parties must demonstrate that the value of the temporary delay in foreclosure exceeds $75,000, “such as the transactional costs to the lender of delaying foreclosure or a fair rental value of the property during pendency of the injunction” (in addition to any compensatory damages plaintiffs may be seeking). Id. at *5.

Read More

Spokeo Redux: Ninth Circuit Holds That a Statutory Violation under FCRA May, without More, Establish a Concrete Injury for Purposes of Article III Standing

By: Andrew C. Glass, Gregory N. Blase, Roger L. Smerage, Hollee M. Watson

The Ninth Circuit has opined, again, on whether a statutory violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq.—by itself—constitutes a concrete injury for Article III standing purposes. Last year, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s original opinion on the issue. Although the Ninth Circuit had reviewed the plaintiff’s allegations for existence of a particularized injury, it had not separately analyzed whether they described a sufficiently concrete injury. In Spokeo, the Supreme Court ruled that “a bare procedural violation [of a federal statute], divorced from any concrete harm,” does not suffice to “satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” But the Court declined to define a “bare procedural violation” in favor of allowing the Ninth Circuit to first consider the question. Now that the Ninth Circuit has done so, the Supreme Court may take up the question once more.

To read the full alert, click here.

Federal Court of Appeals Holds That Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Are Not Agents of the United States, But Open Questions Remain

By: Amy Pritchard Williams, Roger L. Smerage

Affirming the dismissal of a qui tam lawsuit based on certifications made to the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that neither entity is an officer, employee, or agent of the United States. Therefore, demands or requests for payment made to these entities are not claims under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(i) of the False Claims Act. United States ex rel. Adams v. Aurora Loan Services, Inc., — F.3d —-, 2016 WL 697771 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2016).

Read More

Copyright © 2018, K&L Gates LLP. All Rights Reserved.