The Ninth Circuit recently limited the availability of diversity jurisdiction for certain cases with claims involving mortgage loan modifications. Specifically, in Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that, where the plaintiff-borrower “seeks only a temporary stay of foreclosure pending review of a loan modification application … the value of the property or amount of indebtedness are not the amounts in controversy.” — F.3d —-, 2017 WL 6601872, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2017). Rather, to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement in such cases, parties must demonstrate that the value of the temporary delay in foreclosure exceeds $75,000, “such as the transactional costs to the lender of delaying foreclosure or a fair rental value of the property during pendency of the injunction” (in addition to any compensatory damages plaintiffs may be seeking). Id. at *5.
After paying for groceries with a credit card or debit card, the clerk hands the receipt to the customer. In addition to the last four digits of the card number, it contains the first digit. Or perhaps it contains the first six digits. Or maybe the expiration date. Is this a concrete injury that provides the customer standing to sue the grocery store?
That is the question federal courts have grappled with since the Supreme Court decided Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins in May 2016. The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”) regulates retailers’ conduct in printing card number information on customers’ receipts and provides a private right of action for alleged violations. But, as discussed below, a customer may not have standing to sue in federal court or even in certain state courts just because a violation may have occurred.
The Ninth Circuit has opined, again, on whether a statutory violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq.—by itself—constitutes a concrete injury for Article III standing purposes. Last year, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s original opinion on the issue. Although the Ninth Circuit had reviewed the plaintiff’s allegations for existence of a particularized injury, it had not separately analyzed whether they described a sufficiently concrete injury. In Spokeo, the Supreme Court ruled that “a bare procedural violation [of a federal statute], divorced from any concrete harm,” does not suffice to “satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” But the Court declined to define a “bare procedural violation” in favor of allowing the Ninth Circuit to first consider the question. Now that the Ninth Circuit has done so, the Supreme Court may take up the question once more.
To read the full alert, click here.
The D.C. Circuit recently gave its opinion as to whether pleading an increased risk of future injury is sufficient to establish Article III standing to sue in a data breach class action filed in federal court. The issue has divided federal circuit courts of appeals.
In answering in the affirmative, the D.C. Circuit joined the view of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. Compare Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., — F.3d —-, No. 16-7108, 2017 WL 3254941 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 2017), with Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. Appx. 384 (6th Cir. 2016) (unpublished); Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016); and Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). In Attias, the plaintiffs did not allege that they had suffered identity theft as the result of a hacking incident involving a system containing their data. The defendant argued that the mere threat of future harm was too speculative to give rise to standing. But the D.C. Circuit held that it was plausible that the unauthorized party had “the intent and the ability to use [the] data for ill” and thus that the plaintiffs had jurisdictional standing at least at the pleading stage. Id. at *1, *5-*6. Notably, the standing issue arises under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit did not otherwise decide whether the plaintiffs’ allegations stated a claim that could withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), allowing the district court the opportunity to first review the question.
By contrast, the Second and Fourth Circuits have held that data breach plaintiffs lack standing where they plead nothing more than an increased risk of future injury. See Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., — Fed. Appx. —-, No. 16-260, 2017 WL 1556116, at *1 (2d Cir. May 2, 2017) (unpublished); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom., Beck v. Shulkin, No. 16-1328, 2017 WL 1740442 (U.S. June 26, 2017).
Notwithstanding the circuit court split, the United States Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari to review the issue. We will continue to monitor and report on developments in data breach standing law as they occur.
Effective December 1, 2017, certain amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“the Bankruptcy Rules”) recently adopted by the Supreme Court will impact the allowance of secured claims in bankruptcy. Below, we focus on the amendments to Bankruptcy Rule 3002, which will serve to:
- Clarify that Rule 3002 applies to secured claims in cases pending under chapters 7, 12, or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
- Shorten the deadline for filing proofs of claim to seventy (70) days after the bankruptcy filing.
Recently, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) promulgated its final arbitration agreement rule. The rule comes more than 11,000 comments, 13 months, and one change in presidential administration after the CFPB issued its proposed rule in May 2016. (K&L Gates previously reported on the issuance of the proposed rule here.) Yet despite its long history, Congress began taking steps to repeal the rule almost immediately.
Last week, a bi-partisan coalition of political groups and the federal government completed briefing cross motions for summary judgment in American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al. v. Sessions, Case No. 5:16-cv-00252-D (E.D.N.C.). The case challenges the constitutionality of a portion of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The plaintiffs contend that the TCPA’s prohibition on making auto-dialed calls or texts to cell phones without the requisite consent, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the “cell phone ban”), imposes a content-based restriction on speech that fails to pass strict scrutiny and is unconstitutionally under-inclusive (the plaintiffs’ complaint is discussed here). The government is defending the statute’s constitutionality (previously discussed here).
On May 4, the House Financial Services Committee (“HFSC”) concluded its three-day markup of H.R.10, the Financial Choice Act (“FCA”), a bill to reform the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”). The HFSC reported the bill favorably to the full House by a vote of 34-26. All 19 Democratic amendments were rejected on party-line votes. Republicans did not offer any amendments but focused their efforts on raising concerns about the extent to which Dodd-Frank has stifled economic growth and put taxpayer money at risk. Committee members debated a number of the more controversial provisions of the FCA, including Title VII to restructure the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and remove its unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (“UDAAP”) authority; Section 841 to repeal the Department of Labor’s conflict of interest-fiduciary duty rule; Section 111 to repeal the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) Orderly Liquidation Authority; Title IX to repeal the Volcker Rule; and numerous reforms to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) shareholder proxy voting rules.
To read the full alert, click here.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the filing of a proof of claim in bankruptcy proceedings with respect to time-barred debt is not a “false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable” act within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) when there continues to be a right to repayment after the expiration of the limitations period under applicable state law. The Court’s decision in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson  resolved a split among the federal courts of appeal about the application of the FDCPA to proofs of claim in bankruptcy proceedings. While the decision is favorable for creditors, applicable state law (Alabama, in this case) played a key role in the Court’s conclusion that the creditor held a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. Creditors must be aware of and review the relevant state law in the jurisdiction of collection to determine whether the filing of a proof of claim could be deemed false, deceptive, or misleading.
To read the full alert, click here.
Members of the K&L Gates Financial Institutions & Services Litigation Group will speak on key topics at the upcoming the MBA’s Legal Issues and Regulatory Compliance Conference in Miami, FL (May 7-10).
Olivia Kelman will review the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) as well as other lending-related requirements of the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) on Sunday afternoon (May 7).
Andrew C. Glass will address major litigation and enforcement trends, including cases heard or pending before the Supreme Court and other federal courts on Monday afternoon (May 8).
Paul F. Hancock will discuss fair lending issues affecting business models and practices, a topic of particular interest with the entrance of a new administration, on Monday afternoon (May 8). Paul also will facilitate a fair lending roundtable discussion later that same afternoon.
In addition, many of our group’s attorneys are attending the conference. We look forward to seeing you all in Miami!